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 ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that whether genetic modification of crops is seen as radically 
different or simply a further step of ‘traditional’ breeding techniques affects the 
perception of the associated benefits and risks of their commercialisation and the 
wider context scrutinised to assess potential consequences.  Current risk regulation 
and GM legislation is narrowly defined, and largely concerned with scientific evidence 
of harm to human health and the environment.  This contrasts with the public disquiet 
and a greater concern for overarching issues such as institutional and power 
structures (and the way political decisions are made), the role of science in society 
and the social and economic impacts of new technologies in the UK and abroad.  The 
paper shows how the debate over GM technology has been framed and reflects the 
broader tensions within society.  First, broadly political factors are discussed, 
followed by economic considerations to show how socio-economic factors influence 
and are influenced by novel technologies. Finally, welfare impacts and issues relating 
to less industrially developed economies are considered. 
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INTRODUCTIONi
The scientific techniques termed ‘genetic modification’, and in particular the new food 
products that have resulted from their use, have been widely interpreted in public 
debate as representing a radically new direction for global food production systems, 
and even for society as a whole.  Whether this is seen as beneficial or threatening 
depends in part upon the extent to which something being genetically modified (GM) 
is seen as a departure from the past.  Such techniques can be debated in terms of 
their own scientific reference base (genetic manipulation vs. traditional breeding 
techniques) or within a broader frame of technological development in modern 
society (economic growth vs. the environment) with corollaries to other recent 
innovations, for example, in computing and telecommunications.  While the scientific 
debates may be important in their own right, they are often far removed from the 
drivers of public concern.Public disquiet over the impacts of technological innovation 
is intrinsic to the type of modern economy in which we live, and similar concerns are 
expressed across a range of problems facing society from biodiversity loss and 
global climate change to nuclear power.  The overarching issues include the 
institutional framework for appraising and managing risk and uncertainty, the role of 
both science and markets within society, understanding of human-environment 
interactions, and the distribution of power and wealth.  Thus, new technologies can 
bring into focus fundamental conflicts in our society relating to the institutional and 
economic framework which regulates the development and marketing of new 
technologies.  The tensions that emerge through public debates on genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) concern the relationships between the wider public and 
scientists who develop new technologies, corporations that bring them to market, and 
regulators expected to place controls on their development and commercialisation. 
 
A common critique of public debates concerning GMOs is the failure to address and 
understand the scientific detail.  General survey questions testing public knowledge 
find that the vast majority of people know little or nothing about the techniques in 
question (e.g., Morris and Adley, 2001: 46).  This is particularly irksome for scientists 
working on GMOs, and is used as an argument for the invalidity of public opinion.  
Hence McHughen (2000: 1) regards the survey finding that only 40% of respondents 
in the UK correctly recognise that ordinary non-GM tomatoes contain genes as 
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evidence that “there is virtually no discussion of the relevant issues”.  Others see the 
debate as having transcended the technical minutiae of the world in which the 
scientists operate in order to engage with issues of fundamental social importance.  
Across Europe the institutional context within which GMOs have been developed, 
evaluated and promoted is a consistent public concern (Marris et al., 2001: 47).  
Thus, Toke (2002: 74) claims there is no point in “…industrialists appealing to 
‘science’ when the whole nub of the argument is about what sort of science is to be 
pursued in the first place”. 
The following sections showing how the debate over GM techniques has been 
framed and reflects some of the broader tensions within society.  The process of 
regulating new technologies is shown to select certain issues as relevant and define 
the treatment of uncertainty over future events.  From a discussion of broadly political 
factors the paper moves to economic considerations such as how markets operate 
with respect to new technologies.  The aim of this latter section is to place GM food 
within a broader market context and show how socio-economic factors influence and 
are influenced by technologies. 1
RADICALLY NEW OR MERELY NOVEL? 
  Some inherent economic characteristics of GM 
technology are highlighted including crowding out effects with respect to alternative 
research and technologies, co-evolution of economic and environmental systems, 
and socio-economic costs of product segregation.  The final section considers some 
of the welfare impacts covering changes in the food supply chain and issues relating 
to less industrially developed economies. 
Genetic modification has been portrayed at different times and by different people as 
both ‘radically new’ and ‘merely novel’, and a number of the conflicts to be discussed 
in later sections hinge on which of these conceptions prevails.  As Graham (1999: 21) 
discusses in the context of the Internet, the issues is whether or not such a 
technology will transform “the character of personal and social life across a wide 
range”.  Predictions regarding such transformative effects of a technology are hard to 
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make and even for the Internet Graham decides more proof is required. 
Regulators initially appear to have treated GM crops as ‘merely novel’.  The first 
application to the European Union for the commercial production of GM crops was 
acknowledged in February 1994 (Carr and Levidow, 2000: 30).  In the USA, UK and 
many other countries they were initially regulated in the same way as new crops that 
had been bred without using recombinant DNA.  That is, licences were to be granted 
where research had produced no evidence that the products had adverse effects on 
human health (AEBC, 2001: 9).  A few years later, environmental pressure groups in 
the UK began presenting the opposing view that these technologies represented a 
radical departure from previous techniques, and that a moratorium on their 
commercial use should be declared pending proper evaluation (FOE, 1997).  The 
mass media have generally followed the pressure groups’ line, basing their coverage 
of GM foods on the premise that they represent a potentially dangerous new 
departure (Toke, 2002: 70).  Studies of public opinion have also tended to find that 
genetic modification is generally perceived as ‘radically new’. Indeed, the opposition 
between this conception and the approach initially taken by regulators and retailers 
underlies debates regarding how risks and uncertainty are conceptualised.  
Opponents of GM crops ground their objections in the ‘radically new’ character of the 
techniques, and on the issues of safety, uncertainty and morality arising from this 
perception. 
The proponents of genetic modification seem less consistent in that their expressed 
views cover both ‘radically new’ and ‘merely novel’ conceptions.  Biotechnology 
companies, in particular, show an ambivalence in public presentations which reflects 
on the one hand a concern with promoting new products in a manner which excites 
their clients, and therefore emphasises GMOs as innovative and revolutionary 
developments, and on the other hand as based on techniques and expertise which 
are tried and tested, and which therefore present no new risks to society.  Even in the 
absence of such commercial pressures, independent scientists working on these 
                                                                                                                                        
1 A comprehensive review of the introduction of transgenic biotechnology into current food supply 
systems would need to consider, inter alia, marketing channel co-ordination and integration, 
intellectual property rights, farmland tenure and ownership control, international trade 
agreements, domestic agricultural policy including farmer and commodity price support, 
regulatory procedures, food licensing requirements, and consumer awareness. Such a review is 
beyond the scope of this paper and we limit the discussion here to some key concerns 
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techniques are also capable of experiencing the same ambivalence.  McHughen 
(2000: 7-8), for example, reveals his excitement when he announces that “For the 
first time […] we humans now have the ability to modify life in its most fundamental 
form”; while at the same time giving qualified support to the view that, “If we believe 
the ‘suits’ from the multinational corporations, molecular genetic technology is simply 
an extension of past, acceptable technologies and we have no reason to fear it”. 
The distinctions here make a fundamental difference to the public debate because 
they make quite different assumptions about the inherent risks and ability to control 
technologies.  New products founded upon tried and tested methods tend to be 
regarded as of little risk relative to those which depart radically from existing 
techniques.  In addition, decisions about a ‘radically new’ direction seem likely to be 
perceived as more significant than those about ‘novel’ directions.  Spash (1995: 289) 
has described various economic, behavioural and institutional forms of ‘lock-in’, 
where once the path of technological development is chosen, reversing the process 
(i.e. choosing another technology) can become extremely difficult.  If GM techniques 
are portrayed as a ‘merely novel’ refinement of a technology society has already 
chosen, the perceived cost to society of rejecting them is considerably greater than if 
they are ‘radically new’ and the initial decision of adoption is being taken now. 
POLICY, POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC 
How the criteria and methods used to evaluate a new technological development are 
decided is central to understanding the framework for public debate.  When 
biotechnology companies, seed producers and some farmers first expressed an 
interest in growing GM crops on a commercial basis in 1996, the UK government was 
supportive, and believed that well-organised management of these crops would be 
an adequate regulatory mechanism (Toke, 2002: 68).  Public attitude measures at 
the time generally reported low levels of interest, low perceptions of risk, and 
widespread acceptance of GM crops (Morris and Adley, 2001: 44).  Increased public 
concern, which most analysts attribute to negative media coverage, apparently came 
later.  A cited turning point is the summer of 1997 when certain environmental groups 
started to campaign for a moratorium, on the commercial growing of GM crops in the 
UK, on the grounds that the effects of these new technologies on biodiversity were 
unknown (Carr, 2000: 3; Toke, 2002: 68).  This argument was adopted by 
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environmental organisations closer to government, in particular English Nature, and 
in 1998 the UK government announced that field-trials, termed ‘Farm-Scale 
Evaluations’ would be carried out to investigate the effects of individual GM crops on 
biodiversity, before licenses would be granted for commercial use (Gilland, 2000: 60-
62; Toke, 2002: 69).  Environmental groups had in effect managed to influence the 
evaluation criteria by adding biodiversity impacts to the agenda. 
Arguments over GM were brought into the public arena, particularly when 
environmental pressure groups without direct governmental influence first identified 
the issue, and the attention of the mass media was engaged.  The UK tabloid 
newspapers began to refer to GM crops as ‘Frankenstein foods’ and the term was 
also popular with Friends of the Earth (e.g., FOE, 1998).  Newspaper reports 
broadened concerns beyond those of the environmental pressure groups, frequently 
portraying GMOs as ‘radically new’ products with unknown and untested public 
health implications.  Previous perceived failures of regulatory mechanisms to 
safeguard public health were raised (McHughen, 2000: 8), and GMOs were 
associated with a list of diseases including BSE and salmonella (Toke, 2002: 70).  
The risk to public health, according to some surveys, raised considerably more 
concern than effects on the environment, despite the fact that the regulatory 
framework already claimed to safeguard the former, but had at the time made no 
provision for the latter.  A UK survey in early 2000 reported that 29% of respondents 
considered GM food a risk to public health, while “only 13% thought that spread of 
genes or breeding with other plants was a risk” (Toke, 2002).  A survey conducted in 
Ireland in 1999 found that 82% of respondents reported a concern with the health 
safety of GM foods (Morris and Adley, 2001: 46).  Such public concern has 
commonly been regarded as a lack of trust in regulatory institutions and scientists, 
although it could also be explained as a failure by regulators to demonstrate to how 
safeguards operate.  Attempts to account for this lack of trust focus upon the public’s 
attitude to risk, and lack of involvement in decision-making. 
Risk, Uncertainty and Indeterminacy 
Differences have been highlighted between the ways that ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ are 
understood by scientists and regulators on the one hand, and members of the public 
on the other.  Scientists and engineers have a framing of the world derived from 
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dealing with structured mechanical problems where processes are well-defined and 
deterministic. In such a world scientific experimentation is seen to lead to objectively 
identifiable outcomes with associated statistically defined probabilities of occurrence.  
This approach has been extended to non-mechanistic environmental systems and 
taken from the laboratory to the global scale.  However, some writers have claimed 
that such an approach is poorly adapted to dealing with problems that are complex, 
large-scale, and involve substantial commitment from economic and social systems 
(e.g. see Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992; Wynne, 1992).  Unlike technological artefacts, 
widespread systems cannot be designed, manipulated and reduced to fit within the 
boundaries of existing analytical knowledge.  Pragmatic factors, such as finding 
artefacts that can be measured in the desired way, therefore dominate the resulting 
findings.  Thus Carr and Levidow (2000: 31) argue that “…because of the 
uncertainties, risk assessment depends as much on professional judgements about 
the relevance, plausibility, and acceptability of effects as it does on scientific 
evidence”.  Hence Spash (2002) argues for a division of lack of knowledge between 
weak uncertainty, covering standard risk assessment, and strong uncertainty, where 
outcomes are unknown or unknowable.  In the latter case, socially created 
indeterminacy can be more important than a lack of scientific understanding. 
Beck (1992) claims that such contrasting approaches to risk and uncertainty are 
inevitable in modern industrial society, where risks are seen to have their origins in 
the decision-making procedures of organizations and political groups rather than in 
external factors, such as fate, the Gods or Nature.  The management of such risk is 
then fundamentally a political process: “For with the origin of industrial risks in 
decision-making the problem of social accountability and responsibility irrevocably 
arises, even in those areas where the prevailing rules of science and law permit 
accountability only in exceptional cases.  People, firms, state agencies and politicians 
are responsible for industrial risks” (Beck, 1992: 98).  At the same time, the nature of 
the risks we now face has reached the point where “there is no institution, neither 
concrete nor probably even conceivable, that would be prepared for […] the ‘worst 
imaginable accident’, and there is no social order that could guarantee its social and 
political constitution in this worst possible case” (Beck, 1992: 101).  The scale of such 
‘worst imaginable accidents’, and the ‘politically charged’ character of risk have led 
political institutions, he argues, to specialise “…in the only remaining possibility: 
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denying the dangers.  For after-care, which guarantees security even against 
hazards, is replaced by the dogma of technological infallibility, which will be refuted 
by the next accident” (Beck, 1992: 101). 
Beck’s analysis has obvious relevance to the widespread concern that GMOs pose 
risks to public health despite the presence of a regulatory framework supposed to 
protect it.  In the UK, BSE gave members of the British public ample opportunity to 
practise imagining disaster scenarios with respect to food supplies.  At the same 
time, the ‘dogma of technological infallibility’ had apparently already repeatedly been 
publicly ‘refuted’ by a whole series of food scares, making the predictable 
government and industry assurances that GMOs posed no threat to human health 
unconvincing to the majority as evidenced by opinion polls.  Participants in focus 
groups across Europe frequently referred to earlier food scares to explain their lack of 
trust in the institutions regulating the commercialisation of GMOs, and considered 
these events to be indications of inherent flaws in the regulatory institutions and the 
way they operate (Marris et al., 2001: 84). 
Viewed in this light, the widespread concern that GMOs may present a serious 
hazard appears as a symptom of an underlying tension in modern society, 
concerning the management of industrial risk and uncertainty.  Those responsible for 
‘taking decisions’ are held accountable for the risks associated with their choices, and 
tend to respond by ‘denying the dangers’ (the only way Beck believes is possible 
within such a framework).  Relations between members of the public and political and 
regulatory institutions then inevitably deteriorate, as evidence emerges that certain 
dangers refuse to be denied.  For some writers, the solution to this dilemma is for 
regulatory institutions to explicitly acknowledge the uncertainty inherent in decision-
making procedures, rather than persisting in ‘denying the dangers’.  Stirling and 
Mayer (2001: 552), for example, claim that decision-makers need to be more open 
about the way decisions are reached, “to show precisely how different considerations 
and perspectives have been involved in an evaluative process and what were the 
implications”.  Only thus can suspicions of hidden influence, aroused by evidence of 
links between groups with a vested interest and decision-makers, be allayed – as 
McHughen sums up some of the concerns of private collusion with regard to the 
regulation of GMOs: “Public confidence in political leadership is rarely enhanced by 
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cabinet ministers owning major stakes in biotechnology companies, like Lord 
Sainsbury in the UK…” (2000: 8). 
Partial Ignorance, Power and Public Debate 
When dealing with any problem or information set there is a need to bound 
knowledge.  That is, all problems require simplification in order to aid understanding.  
However, how that process of bounding occurs becomes crucial to the way in which 
the world is understood.  This emphasises the need for taking multiple perspectives 
into account and allowing for the revisions of decisions and avoidance of significant 
irreversibilities.  In studying and modelling economic systems Loasby (1976) has 
termed the process of narrowing down knowledge as the creation of partial 
ignorance.  In the current context, when analysing how economic systems interact 
with the environment different information is emphasised by different interest groups 
and all can be viewed as having only a partial view.  Informed social decision 
processes face the challenge of bringing different perspectives together while 
avoiding manipulation by powerful interest groups. 
Beck (1992: 119) argues the solution lies in reconfiguring the relations between 
‘decision-making’ institutions and the wider public through the “creation of a public 
sphere”: 
“Only a strong, competent public debate, ‘armed’ with scientific arguments is 
capable of separating the scientific wheat from the chaff and allowing the 
institutions for directing technology – politics and law – to reconquer the power 
of their own judgement”. 
This accords closely with the political programme of Habermas (1992), and indeed 
borrows the term ‘public sphere’ from him.  The nub of the argument is that where 
responsibility is assigned to institutions this leads them to attempt to curtail the 
discussion of risk and ‘deny the dangers’.  Beck’s proposed solution appears instead 
to assign responsibility to society as a whole, on the basis of a collective involvement 
in assessments of the nature and acceptability of risks. 
Despite interest from both members of the public and existing institutions there are 
many hurdles to be overcome before achieving the kind of social change Beck 
advocates.  In terms of the debate on GM crops, the criteria considered admissible in 
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decisions on commercialisation exclude many areas of public concern, such as: “Why 
do we need GMOs? What are the benefits? ...  Who decided that they should be 
developed and how? ...  Have potential long-term consequences been assessed? 
How? ...  Who will be responsible in case of unforeseen harm?” (Marris et al., 2001: 
86).  The Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC), set up by 
the UK Government, sums up European Union legislation on granting licenses for 
commercialisation as follows:  
“The legislation does not allow the European Commission or any other 
Member State to turn down an application on grounds other than those 
specified in the Directive.  Consent could not, for example, be refused on the 
grounds of public concern about the technology in principle” (AEBC, 2001: 9). 
Environmental pressure groups bringing GMOs into the public eye did succeeded in 
getting their arguments accepted in the UK to the extent that effects on biodiversity 
were also declared an admissible criterion.  This has been regarded as a radical step 
– Gilland, (2000) who disagrees with such a policy, observes that “Never before has 
an agricultural development been put on hold to examine its effects on wildlife”.  
Nevertheless, an experimental approach was then adopted which saw effects on 
biodiversity, like effects on human health, as a matter to be resolved by scientific 
experts, thereby excluding wider public involvement 
Thus, while many of those involved in taking decisions have agreed that public 
debate is necessary if concerns are to be addressed, they often find this difficult to 
reconcile with the regulatory framework in which they work.  For example, Ross 
Finnie, Scotland’s Minister for the Environment and Rural Affairs, has stated that 
while “I’ve always said there was a need to improve public consultation”, “…the basis 
of any objection has to be science-based, so squaring that with your average public 
meeting is a very difficult process” (BBC News, 2001).  Others reject the notion that 
‘science’ and ‘public meetings’ are necessarily difficult to reconcile (e.g., Marris et al., 
2001: 78-79).  However, such a divide may underlie public concern.  As Levidow and 
Marris (2001: 356-357) also argue: “science and technology have become a special 
problem because they are routinely cited as an objective basis for policy.  […] Official 
expert advice is implicitly equated with ‘science’, in turn invoked as if scientific 
knowledge were a value-neutral, even omniscient basis for regulatory decisions”. 
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The AEBC (2001: 9-10) have concluded: “Public concerns which go beyond the 
criteria prescribed for the regulatory arrangements have no expression in this 
process”.  This means individuals with objections considered to be ‘unscientific’ are 
unable to voice them within the context of the regulatory framework.  Even where 
objections might be construed as ‘scientific’, they can only relate to the issues of 
public health and effects on biodiversity. 
“The narrowly-based risk assessment approach to decision-making seems to 
us to be at the root of much of the public concern.  The public is not 
necessarily expressing a lack of trust in science or scientists, but simply 
pointing out that judgements are being made, both within and beyond the 
science, which demand wider public involvement” (AEBC, 2001: 42).  
The scope for influencing decisions regarding the regulation of GM crops through 
‘official’ routes is therefore currently constrained by existing national and European 
legislation, which restricts this input to particular groups of people (e.g. ‘scientists’), 
and to specific topics (e.g. human health and biodiversity), irrespective of public 
concerns and preferences.  A slightly more open approach to public engagement is 
taken in the Aarhus Convention; and hence it is maybe surprising that the recently 
revised European legislation on the release of GMOs (European Directive 
EC/2001/18) continues to restrict nation states to reject GM crops only on the basis 
of scientific evidence of adverse health or environmental impacts.  Thus, even where 
public consultation or deliberation takes place, whether and how outcomes will 
influence decisions or policy outcomes is at the discretion of existing national and 
international decision-makers/politicians and how they position their case under 
current legislation.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to briefly look at the approaches, 
outcomes and criticisms of attempts to scale up public participation as for example 
attempted in the UK’s official GM consultation exercise. 
Approaches, Outcomes and Criticism of the UK’s National GM Debate 
The ‘GM Nation? The Public Debate’ officially took place over a 6-week period 
between 4th June and 18th July 2003.  The overall aim was to find out what people 
across the UK think about the possible commercial production of GM crops in the UK 
and the options for possibly proceeding with this, and also to communicate a 
‘balanced’ set of arguments for and against GM to the public. 
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In 2002 nine 3-hour long ‘Foundation Discussion Workshops’ were held to allow a 
representative cross-section of the lay public to frame the debate.2 These were 
successful in establishing a wide range of concerns, and helped formulate the 
questionnaire/feedback form (paper and internet version).  Participants also identified 
the need for material to inform the wider public and stimulate the debate.  
Consequently a 17-minute video, booklet and CD-Rom (replicating the content of the 
booklet) were produced as a ‘toolkit’ to support a series of public meetings. 
The public events were organised at three levels.  Tier 1 consisted of six centrally 
organised national/regional events in which participants held round-table discussions 
using the toolkit material to stimulate the debate.  Tier 2 events (about 40) were also 
large-scale events but this time organised in partnership with county councils and 
other public bodies.  These either used a similar format to Tier 1, or invited experts to 
answer questions, or debated a motion.  Tier 3 consisted of several hundred ‘bottom-
up’ local events which  as they saw fit could draw on material supplied by the ‘toolkit’.  
Through these various events and the interactive internet site, several thousand 
members of the public participated and 36,557 questionnaires were returned and 
analysed.  No significant differences could be detected between responses of those 
actively participating in physical meetings from other group of respondents, and 
Table 1 summarises the general picture that emerged from the national debate. 
Table 1: Outcomes of the UK National Debate on GMO in Agriculture (Summer 2003). 
Source: AEBC 2003. 
Key Messages 
People are generally uneasy about GM 
The more people engage in GM issues, the harder their attitudes and more intense their 
concerns 
There is little support for early commercialisation of GM crops in the UK 
There is widespread mistrust of government and multi-national companies 
There is a broad desire to know more and for more research to be done 
Developing countries have special interests 
The debate was welcomed and valued 
 
                                            
2 Eight of the discussion groups involved members of the general public (two socio-economic 
groups and different age groups covered) and one for those “actively involved” in GM (half 
supporters, half opponents). 
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While the national debate was widely welcomed in principle, the process has 
received considerable criticism (see e.g. House of Commons: Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs Committee 2003a, b, c, d; Mayer 2003).  The main criticism was 
levied against the Government who from the outset imposed considerable time and 
budget constraints.  The initial deadline for reporting the outcomes of the debate was 
June 2003 – later extended to September 2003, and this resulted in the public debate 
being limited to 6 weeks; whereas national good practice guidelines recommend a 
minimum of 3 months for public consultation exercises.  To make matters worse, 
results from socio-economic and scientific studies (including outcomes of the field 
trials) only became public at the end or after the formal public debate.  Similarly, the 
original budget allocated was only £250,000 – later doubled to £500,000 – which 
restricted spending on publicity, production of support material to stimulate debate, 
and the possible formats of debate (e.g. no use of television broadcasts).  Similar 
undertakings in New Zealand and the Netherlands in comparison received about £2 
million, with populations of only about 1/16 and 1/4 respectively of the UK (Select 
Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 2003e). 
The failure to attract the wider public (most meetings were attended by relatively well-
informed and already politically engaged individuals) was also seen as a direct result 
of time and budget constrains.  Furthermore these constraints also led to the decision 
of employing the Central Office of Information (COI) to manage and facilitate the 
debate despite doubts, and later criticism, as to their ‘independence’ from 
Government as well as experience and capacity to run such large-scale event.  
Certainly, many participants and interest groups viewed the toolkit resources as 
unimaginative, uninformative and inadequate. 
Finally, the Government has been vague as to how it will consider the outcomes of 
this public debate, with a formal response expected sometime in March 2004.  It is 
also unclear how the different strands of their investigations - public debate, scientific 
research and socio-economic aspects -will be ‘compared’ as Government made little 
attempts to link the different strands. 
ECONOMIC CONCERNS 
A key driver in the adoption of new technologies is the economic return to 
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entrepreneurs who take up such innovations.  There is a perception within national 
governments and business communities that failure to adopt new technologies 
places a country at an economic disadvantage internationally.  In the context of 
GMOs the case of brain drain to Australia from the UK has been cited by The 
Guardian (September 2003).  In the article Michael Wilson, the chief executive of 
Horticulture Research International, warned that the exodus would have serious 
consequences for Britain's reputation for scientific research and he stated that "The 
way it is going, Britain is lining itself up to become an intellectual and technological 
backwater".  This implies that market competition is a key determinant of which 
technologies will be adopted.  Some, such as free market economists, might support 
this case by arguing that technologies themselves are inherently neutral.3Some 
clarification of the role markets play is therefore required and in this context three 
related questions can be used to help: 
I. What kind of choices can, and should, be made in markets? That is, what is 
the role of a market as a social organising device determining the types of 
technologies which are adopted? 
II. Are there inherent or ‘embedded’ characteristics of GM technology that 
predetermine the type of impacts it will have on social and economic systems? 
III. What are some of the likely economic effects of GM technology within the 
current socio-political and institutional context and how will they be distributed 
given current socio-economic systems? 
The second question separates what can be considered as more intrinsic elements of 
the technology, which can be usefully distinguished from the third, which concerns 
the likely means of implementation and associated distribution of economic 
advantages within society.  The issue of what kind of decisions are made in markets 
can thus be separated from questions concerning the effects of technological 
innovation upon markets.  The ‘inherent’ characteristics of biotechnology are 
                                            
3 The FAO (2001) notes in its recent report on the ethics of GMOs: “[G]enetically modified 
organisms, like all new technologies, are instruments that can be used for good or for bad in the 
same way that they can be either democratically managed to the benefit of the most needy or 
skewed to the advantage of specific groups that hold the vital political, economic and technical 
power. In the case of GMOs, it must be noted, the main beneficiaries to date have been the 
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considered below while highlighting several ways in which institutions, economies 
and ecosystems are intertwined.  The effect of GM in food supply chains and the 
agricultural systems of industrially developing countries are also briefly considered. 
Markets, Freedom and Choice 
The market, as an human institution is essentially a mechanism for resource 
allocation.  The information which enables a market to fulfil this function is contained 
in the relative prices of goods, wages and services.  Those prices themselves reflect 
both factors which determine prices within the system and those which set the 
boundaries of the system.  In this way, every market price reflects an institutional 
package alongside a production package.  Institutional packages include such things 
as product safety regulations, minimum wage legislation and environmental licences.  
Such institutional aspects cannot, by definition, be chosen within the market place 
because they would themselves then be commodities, or at least aspects of 
commodities, which can be traded.  A key political tension within industrial economies 
concerns the choice of those aspects which can be treated as commodities to be 
traded in markets, and those which are determined outside the market and exist as 
market-defining institutions.  Technical market efficiency in resource allocation is only 
a meaningful target if there is acceptance at the societal level of how this efficiency 
serves social purposes, and how it is best served by different kinds of institutional 
arrangements.  The overall guiding principles are ethical. 
The moral conditions underpinning economic systems are inherently of two kinds: (i) 
the rights and freedoms of individuals, and (ii) the welfare levels of individuals.  
These concepts are so closely intertwined that separating them completely is seldom 
meaningful but there are some key distinctions.  Whereas individuals determine 
many aspects of their own welfare through markets, they cannot determine their 
rights and freedoms in a similar way.  The rights of individuals thus help pre-
determine the extent of markets (defining the aspects of society that are considered 
appropriate for inclusion within markets).  In contrast, welfare considerations are 
partially pre-defined by the extent of markets (through the range of choices people 
are able to make within those markets).  Welfare without markets is therefore ill-
                                                                                                                                        
private sector technology developers and large scale agricultural producers, mostly to be found in 
developed countries.” 
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defined but markets without rights are also ill-defined.  The tension to be resolved 
here rests on the domain of choice where individuals can exercise their rights and 
enhance their welfare. 
In this regard the technologies used to produce goods and services are always 
circumscribed by a wide range of socially accepted norms and values.  The current 
debate over biotechnology is intense due to differences over these wider values in 
relation to gene manipulation.  This is a political and social issue, as well as an 
economic one.  The endorsement of controversial technologies cannot be determined 
by open choice within an economic market place because the issue directly concerns 
what is considered acceptable within that market.  The issue presented by transgenic 
biotechnology is thus initially one of deciding on ethically acceptable parameters to 
production processes; only after this has been addressed is it appropriate to consider 
the institutional structures through which development can occur. 
Inherent Characteristics of GM Technology 
Three inherent socio-economic aspects of GM technology are identified in this 
section.  First, the opportunity cost of any research agenda and its potential impact 
on alternative research.  Second, the implications of the technology for the co-
evolution of economic and environmental systems.  Third, the impossibility of perfect 
supply segregation, and the resulting cost implications.  
Opportunity costs of research 
The costs of fundamental research within transgenic biotechnology (e.g. mapping, 
isolating and describing the function of gene sequences) are indisputably high. 
Indeed, one of the frequent criticisms of the current state of biotechnology 
development is that public research into many potentially useful products is very 
poorly funded, whilst privately funded companies have targeted innovation towards 
cost-saving technologies for wealthy Western markets.  More public funding of 
biotechnology is therefore urged to address development needs, but where budgets 
are limited the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative research programmes is also 
an important question, i.e. those development goals may be met more effectively at 
lower cost by other means. 
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Domestic agricultural research budgets have been falling in real terms.  Total official 
development assistance for agriculture fell by 31 per cent over the 1990s in real 
terms, whilst international lending for agricultural development fell by 40 per cent 
(FAO, 2002).  Against the current backdrop of falling agricultural research budgets, in 
both industrially developed and developing countries, increasing proportions of the 
decreasing overall budgets are now becoming directed to biotechnology research.  
There has been pressure on public research organisations to recoup costs through 
marketed applications of their research, which is also encouraged by the intellectual 
property regime surrounding biotechnology.  Such financial pressure inevitably 
narrows research and extension capacity in other areas.  Perhaps of most concern in 
this context is funding of sustainable, organic, and other systems-based agricultural 
research.  These are areas that are inherently unpatentable since they concern 
‘management knowledge’ rather than ‘products’. 
The process of technological development should therefore be considered within the 
general context of alternatives, and the meaning of ‘neutral’ technology in this regard 
is debatable.4  Spending public money on ‘alternative’ technologies, if it occurs at all, 
is usually small because the political process tends to favour large projects offering 
simple solutions, and economies of scale are used to argue in favour of ‘putting all 
the eggs in one basket’.  While the case is sometimes made for public funding of 
‘non-dominant’ technologies to complement private venture capital, agricultural 
research budgets have seldom been very supportive of ‘alternative agriculture’.  
Hence, whilst many researchers stress the potential compatibility of GMOs with 
sustainable systems, in reality the expansion of biotechnological research tends to 
reinforce the industrial model of agriculture, with an emphasis on products rather than 
systems knowledge and applications.  Thus, for example, the University of Minnesota 
                                            
4 The pursuit of nuclear power offers some significant parallels.  The UK government developed a 
programme of funding for non-fossil fuel-derived electrical power generation, based on a tax on 
fossil fuels, in 1989.  Although the resulting support ran to billions of pounds, more than 90 per 
cent of this funding went to supporting nuclear power generation (see Oosterhuis 1996). This was 
itself the result of two factors: the immense cost of nuclear power development, and a 
technological optimism that this would solve the power generation problem ‘once and for all’.  
Regardless of whether the current outcome of the technology is seen as success or failure, a 
direct result was a virtual suppression of energy alternatives, both politically and economically.  
Critics of this particular example argue that had the nuclear budget been spent on a package of 
alternative, known technologies including energy efficiency measures, and innovative research 
into wave, solar, biomass and combined heat and power sources, power generation needs could 
have been substantially reduced. 
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has tried to expand its biotechnology programme while reducing support for its well-
known sustainable agriculture programmes (Benbrook, 2000). 
Perhaps less well publicised is the fact that funding for innovation will almost 
inevitably outstrip funding for monitoring.  Monitoring is regarded as revenue 
consuming (although it may save resources overall by identifying problems) whereas 
product development is regarded as revenue generating (although products may fail).  
More effort, ceteris paribus, is therefore targeted on demonstrating product benefits 
than on exploring possible costs and dangers.  While extensive regulatory 
procedures may be put in place, the simple economic reality remains that research 
investigating potential problems will be much less well funded than the search for 
patentable products.  Thus Wright (2000), in an economic review of GMOs for the 
New Zealand Royal Commission, notes that “[a] relatively small amount of research 
is being done on the impacts of GMOs in the environment (for example, horizontal 
gene transfer) compared with the amount of research being done on potential 
commercial GM products”.  This is seen as an outcome of “… science reforms 
[which] have pushed the [New Zealand] Crown Research Institutes in the direction of 
profit maximisation, or at least cost recovery”.  Since there is also a time lag between 
innovation and the effects of innovation, some scientists caution that the current 
claimed ‘absence of evidence’ of problems should not be taken simply as ‘evidence 
of absence’ of problems (Clark, 1999).5  This would be to confuse Type 1 and Type 2 
statistical errors, i.e. the likelihood that a proposition is found false while in fact true 
compared to being found true while in fact false. Emphasising experimentation for 
crop development runs the risk of accepting the technology as benign by default.  
This has particular implications when uncertainty is high, potential problems poorly 
understood, and in addition when budgets are under pressure. 
The industrially developing world is caught in a double bind in this regard.  Resources 
for effective regulatory and monitoring systems are simply unavailable in many 
countries that will be faced with pressure to accept GM foods and seeds.  Many of 
                                            
5 Experience with GM crops is currently limited to a few commercialised products and adoption in 
only a handful of countries.  Predominantly there has been a rapid adoption of herbicide resistant 
soybeans and insect resistant cotton and corn in the USA, accounting for roughly 75 per cent of 
all plantings, with Argentina, Canada, and China the only other countries planting any significant 
acreage of GM crops (notably canola, soybeans, cotton and tobacco).  All these ‘first generation’ 
GM crops have been developed with crop management characteristics in mind. 
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these countries also lie in the Vavilov centres of plant genetic diversity where 
particular caution is urged due to the areas’ ecological significance.  This combination 
of resource constraints, development pressure and ecological sensitivity raises a 
wide range of concerns over international equity, self-determination and public 
cooperation in science, which creates a great challenge for international agreements. 
Co-evolving economic and environmental systems 
Insect resistant crops have been one of the most widely adopted transgenic 
biotechnologies to date, with an estimated 12 million hectares planted in 2001 
(James, 2001).  These crops rely on engineered plant production of varieties of the 
naturally occurring toxin, Bacillus thuringeinsis (Bt).  The properties of Bt as an 
insecticide have been well known for decades, with Bt compounds being the only 
permissible pesticides used in organic agriculture. 
Whilst these technologies may reduce the need for some external applications of 
insecticides in industrial systems, they are subject to the same pest-resistant 
problems that affect all pest management products.  When insect pests are subjected 
to selective environmental pressures, successive generations develop resistance to 
those pressures.  Hence modern intensive cropping systems are locked-in to a 
continual product development struggle against natural pests which thrive in the 
monoculture environments, and which develop resistance to each new pesticide over 
several generations (Norgaard, 1994).  The costs of crop management have hence 
risen accordingly and new crop varieties are required at regular intervals.  
Sustainable agro-ecological systems replace this ‘temporal’ rotation of crops and 
products in industrial agriculture with a ‘spatial’ rotation, which in combination with 
other techniques aims at prevention of the build-up of pests to economically 
significant levels. 
Recognising the issue of pest resistance to Bt crops, management guidelines based 
on the refuge concept have been developed by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to attempt to reduce the risk of resistance developing in pests.  The 
refuge is an area of non-Bt crop that harbours pests that are not subjected to 
selective pressure and which should interbreed with those within the Bt fields, helping 
to prevent ‘pure breeding’ of resistant pests and a concomitant accelerated rate of 
Genetically Modified Organisms in Agriculture: Social and economic implications 
 19 
resistance development.  Initially voluntary refuges of 5-10% of the cropped area 
were assumed adequate, but rapidly this was raised to 20% and made mandatory, 
and to 50% where Bt corn is grown next to Bt cotton. 
Critics have pointed out the difficulties of ensuring adoption of such a ‘refuge’ 
approach in poorer nations where extension services are heavily overstretched and 
mismanagement of agricultural chemicals is widely acknowledged, and is itself a 
significant health problem.  Whilst reduced external applications of chemicals will 
help reduce direct health problems for farm workers, the biotechnology ‘solution’ may 
present alternative problems and relief may only be short term.  Even assuming 
continual innovation at a faster pace and with more sophisticated defence 
mechanisms than pests themselves, those farmers who remain outside the agro-
industrial system, or who cannot pay for the ever rising expense of seed or crop 
protection products will become increasingly vulnerable.  Alternative, and particularly 
organic agricultural, systems will suffer accumulative stress if GM crops accelerate 
pest resistance to Bt or other naturally occurring plant defence mechanisms. In fact, 
the prospect of being locked-in to a ceaseless (but patented) effort to produce new 
crop varieties at faster rates, against a backdrop of making alternatives unviable, is 
theoretically the economically ideal state for private biotechnology companies. 
The aspects of strong uncertainty which arise here are identifiable in the following 
summary of the situation by Nelson et al. (1999: x-xi): 
“Much attention is being paid to resistance in the target pests; less has been 
paid to the potential for development of resistance in secondary pests that 
pose a threat to other crops.  The loss of effectiveness of Bt toxins would be 
particularly serious for the organic industry, which relies heavily on Bt-based 
bioinsecticides.  In essence, US agriculture is conducting a large-scale 
‘experiment’ to test resistance management strategies for Bt crops.  Elements 
of this experiment include optimal sizes of refuges and viability of voluntary 
compliance approaches.  The outcome could have serious consequences for 
agriculture as a whole, and for potential acceptability of other new 
technologies. […] More generally, we find that great uncertainty remains about 
the unintended effects, positive and negative, of GMOs currently in use and 
those that are under development.  It is somewhat disconcerting, for example, 
that possible negative effects for the monarch butterfly were not evaluated 
before the Bt technology was widely disseminated.  Clearly, more research is 
needed in this area.” 
However, the extent to which more research can be expected to help is limited by the 
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inherent characteristics of the technology in this respect and the need to address 
strong uncertainty. 
The UK farm-scale evaluation (FSE) between 2000 and 2002 are the largest world-
wide to compare the effects of GM herbicide-tolerant (GMHT) crop varieties on 
‘weeds’ and invertebrates with their conventional counterparts and farming practices 
(i.e. no comparisons with bio-dynamique or organic production systems).  Sugar 
beet, fodder beet, maize and spring-sown oilseed rape – the most likely varieties for 
commercial production in the UK – were grown in 273 trial fields (half had GMHT, the 
other half conventional crops) and monitored.  The results for beets and oilseed rape 
showed reduced presence of invertebrates and weeds and hence suggest that 
commercial use of GMHT varieties would have adverse impacts on biodiversity in 
farmland landscapes.  On the other hand, GMHT maize fields harboured more 
wildlife than adjacent plots growing non-GM maize.  However, ‘conventional practice’ 
included the use of Atrazine (a herbicide highly toxic to insects and already banned in 
some European countries) whereas the GMHT plots were treated only once with 
glufosinate ammonium (resulting in vigorous weed growth that substantially reduced 
the final yield) rather than the commercially recommended weed killer which contains 
32% atrazine.  This was later criticised and the field trials for maize seen as flawed 
and worthless (e.g. Dube 2003).  In addition to disagreements over these specific 
management practices used in the field trials, British statutory nature conservation 
agencies point to the uncertainties in predicting impacts on biodiversity: 
“We cannot and will not predict the magnitude of adverse or beneficial effects 
on biodiversity of herbicide regimes associated with the crops tested. [...] as 
the FSE research team pointed out, such estimates rely on assumptions about 
uptake by farmers, distribution and areas of GMHT crops cultivated and policy 
influences such as the impact of CAP reforms on cropped areas.  In addition 
any forward look would have to take into account the impacts of UK and 
European measures to encourage non-food uses of these crops.  We argue 
that these factors are almost impossible to predict with any degree of 
certainty.”  (Countryside Council for Wales, English Nature, JNCC and Scottish 
Natural Heritage, 2003: 4.1) 
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Hence, while general trends in effects on biodiversity may be picked out from the 
trials, trying to estimate the magnitude of impacts over landscapes and crop 
rotations is seen as premature and potentially misleading (ibid: 5.1).Socio-economic 
costs of product segregation 
The ability of GM plants to cross fertilise with non-GM plants, thereby creating 
progeny that are effectively GM, has been a major concern amongst 
environmentalists.  Scenarios of cross fertilisation include both environmental and 
market impacts.  The former cover possible production of ‘superweeds’ and the 
transfer of other traits into wild species which then continue to be widely replicated.  
The latter refer to the crops of organic or conventional producers being contaminated 
so they cannot be sold through (currently) premium non-GM market channels.  The 
market impacts are addressed here. 
Two critical factors determine GM and non-GM system compatibility: (i) the distances 
over which cross-fertilisation may occur, and (ii) the purity level below which crop 
contamination is considered negligible.  The probability of contamination will depend 
on the fertilisation route, and declines with distance between crops.  The appropriate 
separation distances required between crops remains uncertain and debated.  In the 
UK use is made of the separation distances specified for seed production, which are 
typically between 50 and 400 meters depending on crop type.  The UK organic 
movement argues that much greater distances of up to 6 kilometres should be 
designated. 
The UK field trials found that bees were able to carry GM oil seed rape pollen for up 
to 16 miles (The Guardian, 14th October 2003).  This makes isolating GM oil seed 
rape from conventional crops by physical separation virtually impossible.  In addition, 
once GM oil seed rape has been grown in a field a conventional crop could not be 
grown for 16 years in the same field without fear of contamination of more than 0.9 
per cent (the threshold for claiming that the crop is GM-free).  Separate trials of GM 
forage maize and sweet corn failed to show similar travel.  A study by a group of 
researchers from the University of Reading, the National Institute of Agricultural 
Botany in Cambridge, and the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology in Dorset stated that 
GM oilseed rape is certain to breed with wild crops and produce hybrids.  Their 
findings also stated that: "The presence of hybrids is not a hazard in itself and does 
not imply inevitable ecological change... an estimate of UK hybrid abundance 
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represents only the first step toward a more quantitative assessment of risk at the 
national level". (Wilkinson et al., 2003: 459). While the issue of pollen transfer is itself 
open to scientific enquiry, the other key consideration - the level of GM cross 
contamination considered acceptable - is more clearly a social, economic and ethical 
matter. 
Organic farmers in the UK have insisted that their consumers require very high levels 
of purity regarding non-GM produce.  The past UK Environment Minister, Michael 
Meacher, suggested a tolerance of 1.0 per cent GM contamination might be thought 
too high by the public and asked the AEBC  to consider the possibility of a 0.1 per 
cent threshold (AEBC 2001).  However, based on simulation models of the extent of 
crop contamination expected under different levels of GM adoption, a report to the 
European Commission regards a 0.1 per cent contamination threshold to be close to 
unattainable (Bock et al., 2002).  This level is then beyond determination within the 
market-place since it determines which products can reach the market-place.  
Consumer preferences for uncontaminated products simply cannot be delivered by 
producers.  This either/or choice between a GM or GM-free production environment 
has been a source of considerable debate at the national level in New Zealand, 
where island status offers a particular advantage in maintaining both the image and 
reality of product purity.  In July 2003 the European Parliament voted to lift the 
moratorium on GM foods being sold in Europe if they were labelled: “This product is 
produced from GMOs”.  Calls for thresholds for labelling to be set at 0.5 percent 
failed and parliament backed 0.9 per cent as the threshold. 
The costs of maintaining separate commodity supply chains for GM and non-GM 
crops will vary depending on several characteristics but one estimate based on 
segregation practices for speciality crops is an additional 6-17% of farm gate prices 
(Directorate-General for Agriculture, 2000).  The principal factors affecting 
segregation costs will be the tolerance level for cross-contamination, the genetic 
predisposition for cross pollination and for volunteer plants causing contamination 
within crops, the economies of scale associated with the size of different marketing 
chains, and seasonal aspects of produce which incur additional storage costs.  In 
addition, if only certain downstream processed products can utilise identity 
preservation for marketing, these ‘differentiated’ products will have to bear the full 
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costs of supply segregation. 
Product segregation has another aspect which relates to who gains from innovation.  
Product identity preservation is normally assumed to benefit innovative producers 
looking to extract premiums in the market place by ensuring the supply of valued 
product characteristics (such as taste, quality, region of origin or ‘animal friendly’ 
designations).  The GMOs situation runs counter to this conventional economic logic 
if GM is considered a ‘negative’ by consumers, since the additional segregation costs 
are incurred by competing conventional or organic producers.  That is, GM crops 
create a horizontal market differentiation by introducing a new source of value, 
namely ‘GM free’.6  The ability to utilise this as a product differentiating strategy will 
depend on the response of demand to increased product prices to meet the added 
costs of identity preservation.  Innovators usually pay such costs but if the GM 
attribute is considered negative, non-GM consumers face the costs of separation to 
be assured of GM-free food. In the GM case, the innovator generates additional costs 
for non-consumers of their products, thereby creating ‘pecuniary externalities’ which 
add to the costs for competitors.  Consumers face a price rise for an unchanged 
conventional product, whilst the innovation bearing undesired characteristics 
becomes cheaper by default.  If a majority of consumers consider GM a negative 
attribute, then net social welfare will fall with the introduction of GM crops.  Who pays 
and who benefits in these circumstances is a matter of property rights and their 
enforcement.  Prior property rights would suggest costs should fall on GM food 
producers to separate their products within the supply chain, to avoid imposing costs 
onto the existing non-GM consumers; but the opposite has in fact been the case.  
Indeed contamination at field level forces costs on non-GM producers who would 
then need to bring legal action to claim damages. 
Indeed a farmer in Canada, Mr Schmeiser, has been in litigation with Monsanto since 
1998, when it accused him of planting the company's GM canola (oilseed rape) on 
his land without permission, and demanded that he pay as if growing GM crops under 
contract.  He claims to have followed his usual practice of collecting seeds from his 
own crop to plant for the following year and was very concerned, because of the 
contamination of the pure seed developed for half a century.  Rather than finding 
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Monsanto liable for contamination the judge in the original case ruled that it did not 
matter how the seed came to be in Mr Schmeiser's field, he was deemed to have 
infringed the company's patent rights simply by growing and harvesting it without 
permission.  The judge was unconcerned that the farmer did not spray the crop with 
Monsanto's Roundup weedkiller and therefore gained nothing from the altered 
genetic structure of the plant.  The case is proceeding to the Canadian Supreme 
Court but in the meantime the Canadian National Farmers Union believes any farmer 
suffering contamination will fail to report it. (Hirsch 2003) 
Social Welfare and Distribution 
Assessing whether the introduction of GM crops will enhance net social welfare 
requires comparison of the status quo position (i.e. no GM products) with the world 
after GM crop introduction.  This means the additional cost of a new GM variety is 
weighed against the improved pest or weed control gained as a result.  For example, 
Bt crop generation is claimed to increase social welfare by preventing damage due to 
the European corn borer, which was previously often uneconomic to control because 
the spraying costs were unjustified by the small crop losses.  In general, welfare 
gains arise from either enhancing output or by reducing input costs, ceteris paribus. 
Besides the disputes over how GM might be introduced, and the effectiveness of any 
safeguards and regulations, there is uncertainty over the consequences both for food 
suppliers and the wider community.  That is, the social costs and benefits of GM crop 
introduction are required to calculate the economic impacts but these are unknown.  
The aim here is then to outline some of the general characteristics of likely social 
welfare impacts. 
The supply chain 
Over time the introduction of a technology which increases output without raising 
costs, or reduces input costs without reducing output, is to reduce farm-gate prices 
for crops because either total supply expands, or costs of production fall.  The 
benefits of such technology favour early adopters who increase output or reduce 
costs before prices fall.  Late adopters are essentially ‘forced’ to adopt the technology 
to remain competitive, or else to exit the industry.  This picture is only altered if 
                                                                                                                                        
6 That is, rather than increasing currently recognised sources of value via vertical product 
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demand also changes as a result of the new technology.  The demand for particular 
food products may rise or fall depending upon consumer preferences, and this will in 
turn affect the returns to producers. 
A key distributional issue is which stage of the supply chain bears additional 
separation costs from the introduction of GM crops.  This will determine many of the 
impacts on agricultural systems.  There are three basic factors that will influence this 
distribution of costs: (i) demand elasticities, i.e. how much demand varies with 
changes in the prices of final foods; (ii) market power, e.g. bargaining power due to 
size or specialisation; and (iii) government policy, e.g. quotas or price support 
mechanisms that alter the incentives faced by producers (Buckwell et al., 1998). 
Where demand for food products is price inelastic, changes in price create little 
relative change in the quantity demanded.  Responsiveness to food price changes is 
an empirical matter and can vary by food type and social context.  Basic food stuffs 
can be unresponsive to price (e.g. bread, potatoes, rice) while brands of those same 
food stuffs are highly responsive due to the supply of close substitutes.  Hence the 
desire of producers is to create brand loyalty and product differentiation through 
positive attribute enhancement. 
Market power is a key concern for economists because the idealised free market is 
one where power is evenly distributed amongst numerous small producers while 
many actual markets tend to be dominated by a small number of large companies.  
One area of concern arising over the rapid commercialisation of biotechnology 
products in recent years has been the concentration of such products in the hands of 
a small number of multinational companies.  Following a period of rapid acquisitions 
and mergers amongst biotechnology, seed and input manufacturing companies 
during the 1990s, there are now only a handful of significant multinational 
biotechnology players, including AstraZeneca, Aventis and Monsanto.  
Biotechnologists in both public and private sectors tend to regard this institutional 
context as an issue that is unrelated to biotechnology itself.  For example 
McCloughlin (1999), Director of the biotechnology research programme at University 
California Davis, states that “Western-style capitalism and market institutions … [are] 
hardly relevant to the issue of biotechnology.” However, market power will be a key 
                                                                                                                                        
differentiation (e.g. juicier apples) a new value arises with the appearance of the product. 
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determinant of the size and use of research and development, particularly because 
product copyright acts as a traditional barrier to competition.  The impact of the 
technology is therefore inseparable from the conditions under which it is being 
introduced and by whom it is being developed.  Multinationals are able to muster 
political support more easily than dispersed small-scale producers.  Thus, the US 
government is lobbying the World Trade Organisation on their behalf by claiming first 
the European moratorium, and then labelling are unfair trade practices.  That the 
concern of European citizens over GM contamination of food supplies and the 
environment found voice shows how political institutions in Europe allow citizens to 
challenge those with concentrated economic power, although the consumer is far 
from the idealised sovereign in the market place. 
Market power in the UK food supply system is exercised at the earlier and later 
stages of the supply chain.  The chain is characterised by a highly concentrated input 
sector, a highly disaggregated farming sector, a moderately concentrated processing 
sector and a highly concentrated retail sector.  Thus, individual farmers are in a 
relatively weak position and will be unlikely to pass additional production costs down 
the supply chain.  Whether the bulk of costs fall on GM or non-GM growers will also 
be partially determined by government regulation and public interest in that 
regulation.  Thus, for example, the rapid adoption rate of Bt crops in the USA has 
taken place against a backdrop of considerable price support for farmers 
(Directorate-General for Agriculture, 2000).  This encourages farmers to look for 
supply cost savings and yield enhancing or maintaining technologies since these 
bring guaranteed advantages under price support, ceteris paribus.  Changes in farm 
support payments and any moves away from production subsidies will also have 
impacts on the incentives to adopt new technologies. 
Industrially developing country perspectives 
Considering potential biotechnology impacts on industrially developing countries 
requires both inter-country and intra-country distinctions.  Even for the purposes of 
simple comparisons, several sectors should be differentiated: there are larger 
farmers, producing both food for national consumption and for export, and cash 
crops; smaller subsistence farmers; landless rural labourers; and the urban poor.  
These groups exist in different proportions in different countries, and the impact of 
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changing agricultural technology varies as a result.  A detailed review of potential 
impacts on developing countries must address these complexities and is beyond the 
scope of this paper; instead we raise a few key points in the on-going debate. 
A repeated argument offered in support of biotechnology is that, although 
fundamental research costs are very high, the final products, in the form of seeds, 
are themselves not ‘high tech’ and can be easily used by and benefit industrially 
developing country producers.  However, the products being commercialised have a 
range of impacts and have been designed mainly for biotechnology company profit 
rather than any ulterior motives.  Three examples of how this commercial goal can 
conflict with the interests of those in industrially developing economies serve to 
illustrate the type of problems arising. 
Case one is where GM is delivering alternative ways of producing industrially 
developing country commodities, such as palm oil substitutes from rapeseed grown 
in Northern climates.  The comparative advantage of industrially developing countries 
in producing such crops are thereby being eroded.  Advances in such 
biotechnologies will cause increased hardship amongst farmers who lose their 
markets and contribute to greater poverty in countries where export markets falter.  
The beneficiaries will be consumers in industrialised economies who receive cheaper 
products, and the companies copyrighting these products. 
The second case is where research has been directed towards labour saving.  For 
example, Integrated Coffee Systems Incorporated is designing a variety of coffee in 
which maturation can be controlled artificially (ACTIONAID 2001).  This will facilitate 
mechanical harvesting.  Currently coffee is one of the few commercial cash crops 
reliant on numerous small-scale farmers, and a large number of labourers for 
harvesting due partially to the uneven ripening of coffee berries.  Coffee supports 
over 7 million farm families mostly in Africa and Latin America.  Biotechnology is 
economically inefficient when applied to saving labour where there is no scarcity.  
The unintended social consequences in terms of reducing the livelihoods of these 
farmers and labourers is then neglected because the technology is being developed 
for modern industrialised agriculture in Western economies where labour is relatively 
scarce. 
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Case three is where the costs of the technology is passed on with the purchase of 
seed.  This increases costs to farmers at the start of the growing season when 
incomes are generally at their lowest.  Financial pressure to borrow is thereby 
increased and if harvest returns are lower than anticipated credit problems will arise, 
leading to loss of small farm livelihoods.  In low-income countries there is seldom 
sufficient alternative employment to accommodate these displaced workers, adding 
to the numbers of urban and rural poor who cannot exercise their demand for food.  
Demand for small-scale local services also then declines. 
Whether GMOs could benefit industrially developing economies is highly uncertain 
but clearly the products actually being developed are being designed for other 
purposes.  The twin issues of direct market competition (lowering export prices), and 
labour reduction (lowering employment opportunities), are possible short-term 
outcomes of commercialised biotechnology targeting the most profitable markets.  
Some potentially more positive impacts could also occur.  Thus, for example, 
increased productivity from reduced labour in staple food production may lead, 
ceteris paribus, to lower food prices, a benefit to the urban poor in particular.  Any 
increase in biological productivity could also generate opportunities for more 
employment in downstream processing, increasing incomes and the effective 
demand for food from employed workers.  However, there may also be better ways of 
achieving such secondary benefits more directly. 
The same is true of the claim that GM crops will ‘feed the world’.  The type of 
argument put forward is typified by a speech of President Bush (BBC News, 2003): 
"Acting on unfounded, unscientific fears, many European governments have 
blocked the import of all new biotech crops, because of these artificial 
obstacles, many African nations avoid investing in biotechnology, worried that 
their products will be shut out of important European markets.  For the sake of 
a continent threatened by famine, I urge the European governments to end 
their opposition to biotechnology.  We should encourage the spread of safe, 
effective biotechnology to win the fight against global hunger."  He added that 
the US biotechnology industry was the strongest in the world, and the US 
needed to keep it that way.  
This kind of statements tend to be very generalised and fail to delineated the 
problems faced into preventing periodic famines, chronic malnutrition and general 
food scarcity.  Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate in Economics, has written over many 
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years on the subject of famine and squarely places the cause at the door of 
undemocratic regimes and lack of purchasing power (for example see Sen, 1986).  A 
lack of purchasing power is clearly a distributional issue and different from a general 
lack of food to supply adequate nutrition.  In 1997, a European scientist's comment 
that: “those who want GMOs banned are undermining the position of starving people” 
provoked the following statement from Tewolde Berhan Gebre Egziabher of the 
Institute for Sustainable Development in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: “There are still 
hungry people ... but they are hungry because they have no money, not because 
there is no food to buy…” (FAO, 2001).  The FAO (2002) shows that projected 
demand growth for food can be met with current technology, but this will fail to help 
the poor.  They recommend pro-poor international trade agreements, sufficient 
sustained investment, institutional capacity building, and changing political will. 
Numerous factors have been identified in the literature on poverty as contributing to 
under nourishment, but lack of advanced technology is largely absent.  There is a 
need to consider the specific patterns of employment, numbers and opportunities of 
the food insecure, security of land tenure, distribution of land ownership, credit 
access, existing technology and international trade barriers.  By way of summary, 
(Kydd et al., 2000) suggest that the optimists and sceptics regarding biotechnology 
and its potential role in assisting developing countries can mostly be defined by their 
views of the Green Revolution itself.  Those who see the Green Revolution as a 
tremendous success point to per capita food increases and suggest GM will replicate 
this.  Sceptics on the other hand see the Green Revolution as a missed opportunity, 
citing the increasing environmental problems now being faced and the fact that 
inequality of access to food has gone hand in hand with increasing productivity.  They 
emphasise the needs of the food insecure and smaller scale subsistence and 
traditional farmers, using simple management practices, building on indigenous 
knowledge and working with ecological systems rather than emphasising the benefits 
of individual products.  Whilst some applications of biotechnology may be possible to 
implement in combination with these alternative agricultural approaches, others are in 
direct competition with the goals that they seek to achieve. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Whether GMOs are perceived as ‘radically new’ or ‘merely novel’ is important in 
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public debates on these new techniques and products.  The mass media and 
biotechnology corporations have recognised this, seeking respectively to inflame 
public interest by playing up radical aspects, or to ease concerns by emphasising 
continuity with existing practices.  From studies of public opinion on GMOs, the 
former perception clearly holds the upper hand in Europe at present.  The ‘political’ 
concerns which have arisen in the context of public debate on GMOs can therefore 
be seen as stemming from fundamental social tensions which erupt whenever 
technologies seen as ‘radically new’ appear on the scene, providing a context for 
renewed debate about their management.  That technologies lock society into set 
development paths and create co-evolving economy-environment interactions 
increases the significance of potential decision points, due to the opportunity costs of 
subsequently reversing the decisions. 
Some writers have suggested that the only way to deal with social tensions is through 
wider public debate, where such debate is linked to decision processes and their 
outcomes.  However, wider public involvement in decisions regarding the regulation 
of GM crops is constrained by existing legislation, which only accepts ‘scientific 
evidence’ on human health and biodiversity to oppose GMO commercialisation.  
While bounding any problem is essential to its understanding, the way these 
particular boundaries have been drawn excludes the possibility of the public 
involvement and the issues they wish to have expressed.  This creates a specific 
type of partial ignorance surrounding the debate and is one reason why technical 
arguments miss the concerns of the general public.  In the UK the public consultation 
exercise was quite novel but beyond airing existing positions and providing lessons 
for future large-scale deliberation/participation exercises appears to have been of 
limited value.  In depth deliberation would require involvement, calling experts as 
witnesses, and evaluating evidence.  A common misconception seems to be that 
GMOs were on trial for acceptance or rejection but in fact each new crop variety will 
be judged on its own via the existing risk assessment procedures. 
The variety of potential impacts of GM development on agricultural and other 
systems raises a broad range of economic issues.  At a fundamental level, political 
debates recognise that the economic market place is itself only one forum for social 
choice, and one which is defined by a set of associated social and legal institutions.  
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If social disagreement exists on the acceptability of biotechnology as a process, this 
fundamental tension should logically be addressed before market commercialisation, 
which would then proceed only on the basis of a shared social position over the kind 
of products appropriate for the market.  In practice, ethical concerns are conflated 
with economic and political factors. 
In terms of the impacts on social welfare the food supply chain must be considered.  
The relative power of different suppliers and consumers in the market place will 
determine how costs are distributed and who gains.  Clearly the strong position of an 
oligopoly of multinational companies is an important factor in evaluating the economic 
implications.  Similarly, USA and European trade politics has a strong bearing on how 
GMOs are regulated. 
Whatever the commercial future of GM products, there are some inherent 
characteristics of the technology which suggest how development will proceed.  
Whilst the technology is heralded by some as revolutionary, the rationale behind the 
features of the first generation of GM agricultural products remains in many senses 
very conventional.  The direct effects of these crops on conventional farm economics 
will determine their immediate commercial viability, but the indirect effects of cross-
contamination on the economics of alternative systems is a new area of controversy, 
and one in which production regulations will have a critical relationship with market 
prices.  By contrast in the industrially developing world, arguments about the 
economic importance of GM technology have centred on the twin imperatives of 
poverty alleviation and agricultural development.  The impacts of GM in these 
contexts are complex but clearly some of the claimed secondary benefits such as 
preventing famine are beyond a single technological innovation and require more 
fundamental understanding and change of the political and economic systems which 
prevent their eradication. 
This paper has argued that biotechnologies are both nested within institutional 
frameworks and carry inherent economic and biological features.  These influence 
not only production methods but also research priorities, economic interactions, and 
ecosystem functions.  At the same time, technology is a development from within a 
set of social and institutional structures and cannot then be divorced from those 
structures. 
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